Robust flight decks are possible in both normal and novel operations. Existing crew resource and error management programs can improve team-centered resilience with Oshry's organization development (OD) principles. The need on the flight deck is to diminish the invisible behavioral gap between espoused theory and theory-in-use by balancing Oshry's four basic elements that make up robust human systems-differentiation, homogenization, integration, and individuation. This low-cost OD vision is offered as a guide for organizations to tailor existing aircrew recurrent training modules. Assessment and diagnosis measures are recommended for continuous improvement, so this OD framework includes adaptive feedback interventions and soft-skills behavioral markers for organizations to consider.
Introduction
Team leaders set the behavioral tone and interaction cues as examples for team members to follow. Since leaders transfer ideas through language, this paper is grounded in communication and leadership praxis. In high-risk environments, teams instead of individuals typically operate complex equipment and technologies. Human-technology aviation systems require humans to cooperate and communicate with clarifying language to increase performance and team situational awareness (TmSA)-use active listening, share critical observations, verbalize and verify critical actions, and monitor and crosscheck crew action and computer management systems (Gunther, 2010; Orlady, 2010) .
Purpose
Commercial airline pilots are generally high-achieving successful professionals, ''and because they have rarely failed, they have never learned how to learn from failure'' (Argyris, 2006, p. 268) . Even with proven crew resource management (CRM) programs that exemplify organization development (OD) processes and serve as models for several safety-critical sectors (Gawande, 2009; Kanki, Helmreich, & Anca, 2010; Vicente, 2006) , many captains and first officers today display concern about their performance and exhibit unilateral tendencies in dynamic situations under stress or high workload (Salas, Fowlkes, Stout, Milanovich, & Prince, 1999) . Often their natural reflexive response is individualistic, unilateral control and win-lose (Argyris, 2006; Klein, 1998; Schwarz, 2005) . This is the difference between ''espoused'' theory in CRM team principles and actual pilot performance ''theory-in-use'' on the frontline (Argyris, 2006, p. 274) . In other words, pilots may be ''unaware of the contradiction between the way they think they are acting and the way they really act'' (Argyris, 2006, p. 274) . This common unconscious paradox identified among high-risk professionals, i.e., doctors, first responders, pilots, business executives, military officers (Argyris, 2006; Klein, 1998) , tends to stifle what could be a robust human system. In this paper I discuss and diagnose leadership behavior at the flight deck subsystem level specifically based on Oshry's vision to create robust human systems (Sales, 2006) . The need on the flight deck is to diminish the invisible gap between espoused theory and theory-in-use by balancing Oshry's four basic elements to build robust human systemsdifferentiation, homogenization, integration, and individuation (paraphrased in Sales, 2006) .
Brief History
For decades aviation management and union safety representatives formulated mission statements focused on safety, but espoused safety values did not prevent several fatal accidents during the 1970s due to flight deck communication and leadership dysfunction, e.g., Eastern Airlines Flight 401 attributed to fixation and failure to monitor and delegate tasks; the Tenerife disaster and United Airlines Flight 173 in Portland, both attributed to authoritarian captains and crewmember unassertiveness. Jointly, airline management, outside consultants, and pilot union safety representatives developed and established the first-generation operational CRM program (Blake, Mouton, & CLR Steering Committee and Working Groups, 1982) . Now, laws and regulations mandate CRM training in America and in more than 190 countries (Kanki et al., 2010; Vicente, 2006) . Fifthgeneration program principles that include flexible leadership patterns and proactive open communication make up the understructure to integrate CRM and threat and error management (TEM) (Gunther, 2010; Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999) . CRM is how aircrews communicate and manage resources, and since human-machine systems are fallible, TEM is what aircrews communicate aboutidentify and prepare for operational threats, and identify, trap, and repair errors (Gunther, 2010) . Gunther lists many external threats not controlled by the aircrew, such as …weather, maintenance, passenger problems, operational pressures [and fatigue], distractions and interruptions, Air Traffic Control (ATC) errors, language/ communication problems, etc…. One of the primary countermeasures to managing threats effectively is flight deck leadership. The attributes of flight deck leadership (i.e., setting the example, planning ahead, initiative, fostering communications, etc.) are the foundation for effective strategies to manage threats crews face every day. (pp. 430-431).
These threats are not pilot crew errors. Threats tend to change aircrew behavior in contrast to an integration of CRM/TEM principles because assumptions and values are grounded in regulations, company policies, and union statements that embody a pilot-in-command with legitimate authority and ultimate decision-making capacity. Robust CRM/TEM involves integration of legitimate authority into a team culture that harnesses the synergistic power of the crew. In safety-critical environments there is no question about the need for the wisdom of a final decision-maker with quick actions such as for a rejected takeoff near critical engine failure speed-V1, but humans are fallible in complex systems and team building may benefit from a balancing of Oshry's OD system elements.
The Vision: Building Robustness by Balancing Oshry's Four Basic Elements
Differentiation, the first element in robust systems, refers to ''how and how much a system elaborates differences, tolerates internal richness, and interacts with a complex environment'' (paraphrased in Sales, 2006, p. 334) . Pilots successfully operate in a dynamic environment with sophisticated equipment, weather, security, radio communications, and multiple layers of interaction with peoplestandard briefings and procedures. Given the incredible amount and complexity of information pilots have to process, even routine tasks such as busy airport taxi operations, takeoff and landing, fuel balance, altitude and route changes, etc. can overwhelm attention and working memory during critical phases of flight (Loukopoulos, Dismukes, & Barshi, 2009 ). Yet even under extreme pressure, as a whole, the flight deck operates with the lowest human error rate in history in any of the public safety-critical sectors-aviation, airport security, nuclear, healthcare, and environment (Gawande, 2009; Vicente, 2006) . External environmental elements/unpredictables, the confluence of threats outside pilot control produce nonlinear problems and aircrew errors that require open communication and individuation to create resilience, as in the following cases: Even with a robust CRM/TEM leadership systems model demonstrated by crewmembers on UA Flight 232 and USAIR Flight 1549, there still exists an insidious patriarchal command structure with limited tolerance for sharing power on the flight deck, predominately in high power/distance work ''cultures like China, Latin America and some Asian countries that stress respect for rank, elders and leaders [as] paramount'' (Anca, 2010, p. 438) . Inflexible power sharing and decision-making structures tend to be brittle and are amplified by human-technology coherence errors, confusion, omissions, complacency, and when crewmembers are startled.
Oshry ''adds dominance…as an…analytical lens for understanding the impact of position in formal and informal systems'' (paraphrased in Sales, 2006, p. 332) and clearly describes the dangerous tensions typical in this leadership dynamic. ''Others feel constrained, confused, oppressed, and angry in the context of a Dominant-controlled culture'' (paraphrased in Sales, 2006, p. 333) . The old mantra that a ship's captain is god not to be questioned or usurped needs ''generative'' and ''adaptive learning'' (Senge, 2006, p. 767 ) models to displace-which are about creating and coping capacities respectively. Training and dialogue about how to use CRM principles to engage threats and errors have the potential to slowly erode patriarchal boundaries and transform the flight deck system into a true partnership by balancing differentiation with homogenization.
The fact that pilots rarely fly with the same crew from one trip sequence to the next gives special credence to Oshry's homogenization-shared safety values, professionalism norms, standard operating procedures (SOPs), jargon, knowledge, and understanding. Even with these commonalities, we have to support each other in order for the system to work in normal and novel events, and in what the future holds.
The promise of Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) technology to reduce environmental impact and increase airspace capacity, fuel efficiency, and crew situational awareness will likely impede pilot ability to switch attention without omission errors and reduce working memory, particularly by replacing primary voice ATC communications with controller-pilot data link communications in busy terminal airspace operations, and by shifting responsibility of time-based traffic separation and severe weather avoidance to the flight deck (Loukopoulos et al., 2009; Orlady, 2010; U.S. FAA, 2010) . In other words, NextGen flight deck technology use in congested operations that are highly variable and demanding may reduce TmSA from the current levels achieved through voice communications. The reality of day-to-day airline operations is nonlinear-unpredictable (Loukopoulos et al., 2009 ). Hamman and Rutherford (2010) found the following human-technology dynamic:
The main feeling of the line pilot is disengagement with the design process. New devices show up designed by an engineer with very little understanding of the line operational environment. This has led to the affectionate saying about automation: Automation is an amplifier because it amplifies the low workload times in the flightdeck and it amplifies the high workload times. (p. 581).
Oshry refers to this complexity as integration. For example, it takes professionalism and pilot crews utilizing CRM/TEM, SOPs, ATC, dispatch, maintenance, aircraft and external systems, federal air marshals, flight attendants, gate agents, baggage handlers, and passengers as a whole to ensure safe use of air and ground space. Specifically on the flight deck, captains can integrate and individuate crewmembers during the preflight briefing: ''We are in this together to reach our destination, and humans and technology are fallible, so say something if you are concerned, uncomfortable or observe anything that is a threat, unsafe, or not SOP.'' This CRM preflight briefing example creates a safe space and invites openness and critique for individuals to speak up when they observe or perceive something is not right. The aviation environment is too complex for one person to process everything, so captains need to create a proactive communication environment during preflight and other standardized briefings to increase team member participation. This includes a workplace where the ''most task-saturated'' team member ''set[s] the pace for the whole crew'' by verbalizing readiness (Loukopoulos et al., 2009, p. 119) , where flight attendants will call the flight deck with safety concerns, where first officers will stop the aircraft to avert ground conflicts, where dispatch will send significant weather and turbulence updates en route, where either pilot will call ''go-around'' for unstabilized approaches or runway incursions, and where pilots can hand-fly with basic skills pitch, power, and roll settings when automated flight control systems fail. Balancing these four elements creates resilience-the capacity for successful adaptation in the face of challenging or threatening circumstances.
Implementation Through Assessment and Training
In order to uncover our reflexive processes and move to a more robust flight deck system, Oshry's vision could be integrated into recurrent proficiency training cycles using Distelhorst's (n.d.) Leadership Development Plan Phase I Laying the Foundation-Self Assessment as a distance learning module accompanied by selected readings from Loukopoulos et al. (2009) , Klein (1998) , Argyris (2006) , Salas et al. (1999) , Sales (2006) , Schwarz (2005) , Senge (2006) , and Oshry (1999 Oshry ( , 2003 . This home-study module could lay the foundation for integration into proficiency training modules. Pilots would apply Distelhorst's Development Plan Phase II and III (see Table 1 ) and Oshry's robust leadership systems model based on ongoing analysis of actual flight deck communications from deidentified flightcrew testimony/interviews, anonymous error reports-Aviation Safety Action Program, Line Operations Safety Audits, and Flight Operations Quality Assurance. Thematic findings could periodically modify existing CRM/TEM training modules to represent evolving operational threats (see Table 2 ).
Keeping in mind that true strength and generative learning are found not in perfection, but in understanding our own limitations, crews debrief with trainers about specific event sets (Tannenbaum & Cerasoli, 2013) to assess/ diagnose CRM/TEM team performance soft skills using a NOTECHS behavioral instrument (see Table 3 ). Training departments can de-identify the data to evaluate and modify the syllabus. In order to support a safety/just culture Integrated into CRM/TEM on-site currency training and debriefs.
Leadership model
Oshry's vision of robust leadership model will outline the mindset shift needed to balance differentiation, homogenization, integration, and individuation.
Integrated into distance learning module and CRM/ TEM on-site currency training.
Leadership skills
Will outline the methods of systems thinking and critical thinking and focus on the concepts of shared decisionmaking, flexible leadership, team situational awareness, and communication that invite openness and critique to maximize resources and facilitate a robust flight deck.
Integrated into CRM/TEM simulator event set scenarios. The key assumption is ''leadership capacity develops while leading'' (Distelhorst, n.d., p. 75) .
Performance support and appraisal process
Will outline performance expectations, provide coaching, and give effective performance feedback to improve flight deck communication.
Modeled during CRM/TEM debriefing after each simulator session about specific event sets.
Manage performance problems
Will use robust analysis to uncover underlying issues and outline a process for managing problems through dialogic communication and a no-threat performance improvement process.
Integrated into CRM/TEM simulator scenarios and debriefs.
Leadership for a world of difference
Will raise awareness of the flexible leadership knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to enable groups of culturally different people to work together effectively-making difference a resource rather than a problem.
Integrated into distance learning and CRM/TEM on-site currency training/debriefs.
Conflict utilization
Will outline ways to channel conflict productively, set norms that avoid unproductive conflict, and provide processes for conflict management.
Integrated into distance learning, CRM/TEM simulator scenarios, and event set debriefs.
Manage pre-flight briefings Will be used prior to each simulation to practice facilitative communication needed to ensure robust fight operations. This is where the captain sets the tone for open communication.
Integrated into CRM/TEM simulator training scenarios and debriefs.
Note. CRM/TEM principles include the OD systems approach. Adapted from Distelhorst, D. J. (n.d.) . Session 3: System-wide interventions. In D. Distelhorst (Ed.) , An OD practitioner's tool kit: Twenty years of accumulated . Spokane, WA: Gonzaga University Bookstore. 
Conclusion
Captains' invitational use of CRM elements to harness the synergistic powers of aircrew makes the flight deck subsystem robust and more resilient for all stakeholders. Core OD principles that hold the CRM/TEM process together for normal and novel operations include effective communication-listen actively, share critical observations, encourage divergent views, verbalize SOPsleadership flexibility, division of duties, and Oshry's openness to balance differentiation, homogenization, integration, and individuation. CRM/TEM and Oshry's openness make human multiprocessing possible with a systems thinking framework for frontline workers. ''A holistic, problem-driven way of looking at the world with a focus on relationships between system elementsencourages us to think about relationships between people and technology'' (Vicente, 2006, pp. 46-49) . ''Leadership development is 'the expansion of a person's capacity to be effective in leadership roles and processes…to enable groups of people to work together in productive and meaningful ways''' (quoted in Distelhorst, n.d., p. 75 , from the Handbook of leadership development, 1998, Center for Creative Leadership). As leaders we must go beyond the rational, objective, unilateral view of ourselves to a deeper, inner landscape where we affirm the allegiance of individual core values with CRM core values by cultivating community for the sake of both knowing and doing, and by creating a learning organization for aviation where stakeholders can ''uncover, examine, and debunk the myth that institutions are external to us and constrain us'' (Palmer, 2007, p. 205) .
A robust flight deck system can foster an environment that balances a mechanistic dynamic driven by rational management, legitimate authority-federal aviation regulation pilot-in-command rules-SOPs, and technology systems through open communication and flexible leadership. By balancing Oshry's elements we reveal our reflexive behaviors to promote true partnership and individualism, change conversation and culture for resilient flight decks, and recognize that each person brings value to the whole flight operation for optimal team performance. 
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The JARTEL group (2012) NOTECHS Behavioral Marker System. Measurement Instrument Database for the Social Sciences. Retrieved April 5, 2013 from www.midss.ie. Note 2. ''Developing'' replaces the term ''very poor.'' Very poor assessments are associated with top-down evaluations and a unilateral trainer9s perspective. Developing supports key safety culture concepts and helps promote learning during a facilitative training/debrief process. This co-assessment process harnesses collective knowledge and supports a just culture-learning organization philosophy. Both trainer and pilot crew fill out the CRM NOTECHS Assessment Form together about specific simulator event sets.
